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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Paul R. Baier*
I. INTRODUCTION
"The great ideals of liberty and equality," Cardozo tells us,
are preserved against the assaults o f opportunism, the expediency of
the passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments, the scorn and
derision of those who have no patience with general principles, by
enshrining them in constitutions, and consecrating to the task of
their protection a body of defe nders 1
.

Let me begin by praising lawyers-"those who must run the race
and keep the faith. "2 Each term brings many defenders to the bar

of the Fifth Circuit, a court whose annual canvassing of the ideals
of liberty and e quality has made it noble. The lawyer who won Joe
Hogan's case in the Fifth Circuit last term,3 and who later sealed
his victory in the Supreme Court;' deserves the congratulations of
our profession. What a burden to sit in judgment. What a joy to
share in the process. "No higher duty, no more solemn responsibil
ity," Hugo Black wrote in his inspiring way, rests upon court and
counsel "than that of translating into living law and maintaining
this constitutional shield deliberately planned and inscribed for
the benefit of every human being subject to our Constitution-of
whatever race, creed or persuasion."11 Loyola Law Review dedi
cated its first Fifth Circuit survey to Mr. Justice Black, who cared
for "lawyers in the great tradition" as much as he cared for the
• Associate Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University.
Member of the Louisiana Bar and the Bar of the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Ap
peals. Editor, HUGO BLACK: THE MAGNIFICENT REBEL, A PERSONAL MEMOIR, by Hugo Lafay
ette Black and Elizabeth Seay Black, forthcoming.
The author wishes to acknowledge the able counsel and good company of Mr. James
Viator, quondam Lecturer in Constitutional History at the Claremont Colleges, particularly
with respe ct to unraveling the mysteries of the federal Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871.
1. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE or THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 92-93 (1921).
2. Id. at 93.
3. Hogan v. Mississippi University for Women, 646 F.2d 1116 (5th Cir. 1981).
4. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
5. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940).
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first amendment. 8 Civil liberties are, of course, the ultimate re
sponsibility of courts. But it is to lawyers that we look for their
protection in the first instance.
During the term just ended, I was privileged to play the law
yer's part in two cases of grave moment. Certiorari is pending in
one, hence a strict sense of propriety forbids my commenting on a
case referred to in the briefs as Forest Hill II. What is at issue is
the scope of equitable remedial discretion in school desegregation
cases. Whether the chancellor may close two rural communities'
only schools, one pre dominantly black, one predominantly white,
and mix their student bo dies, kindergarteners included, at a mid
point ten miles from home is a troubling question. It split the
panel, two-to-one. A previous panel had reversed and remanded
unanimously. More than that I will not say here, other than to di
rect the reader to the opinion in Valley v. Rapides Parish School
Board. 7 Those philosophically minded might want to have a look
at it.
The other case is final, and an equally strict sense of fealty to
the Fifth Circuit and to the first amendment moves me to discuss
it here. I know In re Baier8 better than I know o ther cases whose
The expression "lawyers in the great tradition" is how Justice Black described law6.
yera who have greatly honored the profession of the law:
{men] like Lord Erakine, �ames Otis, Clarence Darrow, a n d the multitude of others
who have dared to speak m defense of causes and clients without regard to personal
?ani:er to themselves. The !�gal pr�fession will lose much of its nobility and its glory
.
1f 1 t 1s not constantly replenished with lawyers like these.T o force the Ber to become
" ·d ua1s 1s
a group of thoroughly orthodox, time-serving government f,earmg md1v1
· to
hum1hate and degrade 1t.. . . We must not be afraid to be free.
·

.

.

•

.

•

•

In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S.82, 115-16 (1961) (Black, J., di"ssen t"1ng).
.
.
_7. Valley v. Rapides P�1sh

School �d.

[Rapides //],

702 F.2d 1221 (5th Cir.), cert.
IRapi'des I] 646 F·2d 925

denied, 104 S.Ct. 276 (1983), Valley v. Rapides Parish School Bd
(5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 276 (1983).

·

•

Of course, there were other desegregation opinions d urmg
·
t he term ' viz· · Ross v Hous.
ton In dependent Schoo1 D1st., 699 F.2d 218, 225 (5th Cir. 1983) (once sch ! system ·purged
�
of every residue of official discrimination, post-desegregat·· n d emogra�h1c changes do not
bar judicial recognition that the school system is unitar .
ch ool officials who have
effective action have no affirmative fourteenth-amendm t
uty to respond to the private
.
· v. Demso n Ind
actions of those who vote with their feet")· p rice
·
694
epen d ent sch ool Dist.,
. .
2d 334 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding erroneous d"1s trict
F.
· court's method 0f
d etermmmg whet her
ble
"
schools are unconstitutiona1 vestiges
current racially indentifia
of de JUre
·
.
segregat"10n,· the
.
.
.
question 1s essentially one of factual inference and cannot b
�eterm m e d purely as a matt er
of law); United States v. State of Texas, 680 F.2d 356 (fi th
i r . l982) (rever sing imposition
or 1tate-wide remedial order requiring bilingual 1·ns true t•JOn to all M .
.
ex1can- American ch'l
.
1
. .
'
dren of hm1ted English proficiency; district court s ord er t00 b road
and erroneously bas ed
on disputed stipulations).
·

:�

��

1'.1ken

•

.

�

.

8.

No.81-3622 (5th Cir.,

·

Sept. 7, 1982) (Brown Reav Iey,
and Jolly , JJ.) (unr orted).
'
ep
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slip opinions have made a checkerboard of my desk. I shall take it
up

fir st, following the time-honored distinction among practition

ers between the "interesting cases" and the "other fellow's cases."

I believe b y critically evaluating my own case I can offer a few
practice pointers for lawyers who read these pages, as well as re
flect generally on the meaning of the first amendment. Obviously I
suffer from the astigmatism of the advocate; a licked lawyer is of

the same conviction still.9 But I leave to the reader final judgment
on whether the views expressed here have merit or ar e merely

blind musings to no good end. Chief Judge Brown, for whom I
have the utmost respect, has written that the purpose of th is "an
nual looksee"10 is "to maintain the quality of the

j us tice dis

pensed."11 Those called to the task should therefore seek to better
educate the judiciary and the p rofession as to what the law should
be. It is as a partner, not as an adversary, that I make my first

effort at surveying the constitutional work of the Fifth Cir cuit . 12 If
I am critical of the court or of any of its decisions, I beg the reader

to bear in mind Holmes's aper�u: "[O]ne may criticize even what
one reveres. "13

9.

Of course, you should never begrudge judges who rule against you. As one seasoned

practitioner has wisely put it: "It is a fine legal tradition to go to the tav ern to cuss the
ju dge when he decides against you, though assuredly it is unprofessional to stay mad at him
more than 3 or 4 months." Frederick Bernays Wiener to Felix Frankfurter, May 8, 1964,
Frankfurter Papers, Library of Congress, Box 112, F older 002338 (qu o t ed by permission).

10.
11.

Brown, Preface to [First] Fifth Circuit Review. 17 LOY. L. REV. 487 (1971).
Brown, Dispensing Justice in the Fifth Circuit, 23 LoY. L. REV. 681 (1977):

The ivory tower provides excellent opportunity to reflect and review from its height
the law of the land below. Law review c ommentators illuminate the strengths and
wea knesses of past decisions. In unexplor e d regions of the law the commentator may
provide unparalleled guidance to both the practitioner and the court. Consequently,
the law journal fulfills an important role in the maintenance of the quality of justice
dispensed-it better educates the judiciary and the profession as to what the law
should be.
Id. at 684.

12. Doubtless all who undertake survey work of this kind worry about entering into a
dialogue with the court. It does seem presumptuous. But as Judge Rubin has recognized:
In selecting specimens from the year's harvest, commenting on the memorable, iden·
tifying trends that we as judges perhaps do not perceive, and criticizing both our
errors in doctrine and what they consider to be our unjust or unwarranted conclu·
sions, the authors and editors provide invaluable assistance. As judges we welcome
their contribution, like all human beings we esteem their compliments, although we
may sometimes find that their criticisms chafe.
n.ubin, Introduction to Fifth Circuit Symposium, 25 Lov. L. REV. 441, 445 (1979).

13.

Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 473 (1897).
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II.

FIRST AMENDMENT

A.

Theory and Practice

an application for mand amus by a group of
s Elementary School
parents whose children attended Southdown
o rdered closed pursu
in East Baton Rouge Parish . The school was
Judge John
ant to a desegregation decree drawn up by Chief
as the school
Parker of the Middle Distri ct of Louisiana. 14 As soon
repre
elected
their
f
o
d
inquire
s
was closed, Southdowns parent
Board,
the
f
o
r
membe
any
sentativ es on the School Board whether
ns
its staff, or its consultants had ever suggeste d closing Southdow
Elementary School as a possible remedy in the Baton R o ug e deseg

In re Baier was

regation case. The district court's opinion left the matter in doubt.
Naturally the parents wanted to know whose idea it was t o close
their school and the justifications for doing so. To their amazement
the parents were told by their elected representatives that the dis 
trict court had forever barred members of the E ast Baton Rouge
Parish School Board from disclosing to their constituents what was
said or proposed during the unsuccessful settlement negotiations·
that had been held at the federal courthouse. Although their repre
sentatives wanted to talk about the negotiations, their lips were
sealed. Several Southdown parents were lawyers; to them the dis
trict court's silencing orders raised very serious first amendment
questions. Nor could the lawyers find any precedent supporting the
district court's perpetual ban beyond the termination of the nego
tiations. No compelling reason suggests itself why citizens should
be kept in the dark regarding what their elected representatives

have been up to. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals struck down
a similar district court confidentiality order that was issued in the
name of protecting the secrecy of settlement negotia tions· it consti
tuted an unlawful prior restraint of speech in violatio n f the first
II, as it is called, has been followed in the
amendment.1a
aving
Fifth Circuit it
been twice cited in Chief Judge Godbold' s
. :
e� b�nc opm !on .m
v.
Co., 16 which also declared a
d1stnct court s silencmg orders m violation of the first
amen dment.
.
· 1 order cut�mg off dialogu e betw
- 1"! a J·Ud'1c1a
Certam
een the people
and their elected representative s on a matter o f
such vital public

Rogers
?
B�rnard

14.
1 5.
16.

�

�ulf Oil

Davis v. East �aton Rouge Parish School Bd., 514 F.
S upp. 869 (M.D. La. 1981).
Rodgers v. Umted States Steel Cor p. [ Rogers II]
536 F 2d 1001 (3d c·ir. 1976)
·
619 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1980) (en bane) ' rev'd on 0;her
grounds, 4 52 U.S. 89 (1981).
·
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consequence as the loss of a school seems to strike at the core of
the first amendment:
What, then, does the First Amendment forbid? Here again the town
meeting suggests an answer.That meeting is called to discuss and,
on the basis of such discussion, to decide matters of public policy.
For example, shall there be a school? Where shall it be located? ...
When men govern themselves, it is they-and no one else -who
must pass judgment upon unwisdom and unfairness and dan·
ger....Just so far as, at any point, the citizens who are to decide
an issue are denied acquaintance with information or op inion or
doubt or disbelief or criticism which is relevant to that issue, just so
far the result must be ill-considered, ill-balanced planning for the
general good. It is that mutilation of the thinking process of the
community against which the First Amendment to the Constitution
is directed. The principle of the freedom of speech springs from the
necessities o f the program of self-government.17

It is comforting-from the point o f view of general principle-that
words written in 1948 by America's foremost first amendment
thinker, Alexander Meiklejohn, should so neatly fit the problems of
a

future generation. A little later in his book, Free Speech and Its

Relation to Self-Government, Professor Meiklejohn e xposes the
philosophical core of the first amendment:
The primary purpose of the First Amendment is, then, that all the
citizens shall, so far as possible, understand the issues which bear
upon our common life. That is why no idea, no opinion, no doubt, no
belief, no counterbelief, no relevant information, may be kept from
them.Under the compact upon which the Constitution rests, it is
agreed that men shall not be governed by others, that they shall
govern themselves.18

To the lawyers it seemed that t h e district court's orders broke
faith with the Framers. Any notion that the confidentiality orders
were necessary to shield public officials from the consequences of
their own actions is the antithesis of our system of representative
self- government. In this circuit, Dinnan v. Board of Regents1'
holds quite the contrary:
If the decision-maker has acted for legitimate reasons, he has noth
ing to fear. We find nothing heroic or noble about the appellant's

17.

A. MEIKLE.JOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT

(emphasis in original).
18. Id. at 88-89.

19. 661 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1981),

cert. denied,

457

U.S. 1106

(1 982 ).

24, 26 (1948)
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� one vote� ��r
responsibil
in the tenure
a
and
behind them.20

position [a claim of privilege from disclosure of ho

ing a tenure meeting]; we see only an attempt to avoid respons1b�lt�y
for his actions. If the appellant was unwill ing to accept
ity for his actions, he should never have taken part
role of
decision-making process. However, once he accepted such
public trust, he subjected himsel f to explaining to the public
any affected individual his decisions and the reasons

theory. What to do about it-procedurally speaking-is a
kn ot worth unraveling here, lest future first amendment claims be
lost on the flypaper of procedure.

Eno ugh

Three steps came im me d iately to min d : (1) man damus, an ex
traordinary remedy for an extraordinary case; (2) intervention in
the desegregation case; (3) direct action for i nj unc ti ve and declara
tory relief. The first course seemed the right one, particularly in
light of the ruling in Society of Professional Journalists v. Mar
tin,21 in which the Fourth Circuit converted a complaint for in
junc tive and declaratory relief against a federal district court's si
lencing order into a petition for a writ of m andamu s. In the Fifth
Circuit it is well settled that mandamus is an extra ord inary rem
edy; it will not be granted except upon a showin g of compelling
necessity and the lack o f any alternative a ve n ues of reli ef,22 al
though under United States u. Denson23 "whe n t h e writ of man da
mus is sought from an appellate court to confine a trial court to a
lawful exercise of its prescribed authority, the court sho u ld issue
the writ almost as a matter of course."24 But this still leaves the
matter hanging.
The reaction of the court was swift and succinct: "IT IS OR·
that the petition for writ of man dam us is DENIED."2G No
r eas ?n s were as i ned for �he denial of the writ. This left p etitio n
��
.
ers m the agomzmg position of having to guess what lay in the
court's mind.26 Was this an adj udicat ion on the merit s ? If so, conDERED

20.

661 F.2d at 432.

556 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1977) , cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1022 (1978)
22. FED. R. APP. P. 12. See Weber v Coney 642 F
2d 91 ( 5th Cir. 1981); In re Evans,
524 F 2d 1004 (5th Cir 1975)· Steward v. We st, 449 F 2d
324 (5 th c·ir. 1971).
23. 603 F.2d 1143 (5th Cir. 1979) (en bane).
24. Id. at 1145 (emphasis added)_ See generally B
erger The Mandamus Power of the
,
United States Courts of Appeals: A Complex and
Confused Means of Appellate Contro
l,
31 BUFFALO L. REV. 37 (1982).
21.

·

·

·

·

25.

·

'

•

·

In re Baier, No. 81-3256 (5th Cir. May 11
' 198I) ( per Brown. C.J. Tate
,

Politz, JJ.)(unreported).
26.

Of course it is always difficult to divine the

Cf. United States

v.

,

and

��:n�n97g 8o)f �.ne�plai�ed judicial action.

Crouch, 566 F.2d 1311 1316 (5th
,

·

·

( A Judge s statement of his

1983)
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sidering the claims presented, silence seems a cavalier way of dis
posing of the case. More likely, the panel may have thought man
damus was not the proper vehicle for challenging the district
court's orders, or the panel may have felt that, because the School
Board had not objected to the trial court's confidentiality orders,
the parents were in no position to complain. While the first
amendment protects the right to hear as well as to speak, 27 there
must be a willing speaker. At the time the mandamus petition was
filed, the School Board had taken no action challenging Judge
Parker's orders in any respect. Thus the court may have reasoned
that the School Board's voluntary silence precluded the parents
from asserting a right to listen. Before pursuing their case further,
the Southdowns parents decided to await further School Board
action.
Meanwhile, another citizens group moved to intervene in the
desegregation case for purposes of challenging the gag order; and
on July 3 1 , 1981, the School Board, through its attorney, formally
moved the district court to lift its confidentiality orders. Interven
tion was denied, however, with the trial court commenting: "What
conceivable interest other than idle curiosity, can you possibly
have in those discussions? " With respect to the School Board's re
quest, the district judge declared that "[w]hatever they said,
whatever they thought, whatever they said they thought, I do not
intend will be held against them at any later date. "28 After reading
the transcript of the July 31, 1981 proceedings, the Southdowns
parents decided to renew their legal challenge. Suing a federal
judge was a bold step, to be sure, but plaintiffs were determined
somehow, some way, to have their first amendment claims adjudi
cated on the merits. The Fifth Circuit's earlier unexplained refusal
to issue mandamus left plaintiffs no realistic alternative, if they
mental processes is absolutely unreviewable. This court has no means of observing mental
process.").
27. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972) ("In a variety of contexts this
Court has referred to a First Amendment right to 'receive information and ideas' " ). Accord
Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) ("{t]his freedom . . . necessarily protects the
right to receive").
28. The district court added:
"I am totally confounded by the interest, apparent interest in these settlement dis
cussions which led to nothing. They led nowhere. They are over. They didn't work. It
was apparently a bad idea on the part of Court." Record at 141 (July 31, 1981). A
complete copy of the transcript on the School Board's motion to vacate the district
court's perpetual confidentiality orders was attached as Appendix C to Appellants'
Opening Brief in Baier v. Parker.
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were to protect their rights, except to bring a direct action for de
claratory and injunctive relief.
Plaintiffs' civil action was filed on August :31, 1981. It

was

summarily dismissed, on Judge Polozola's own motion, without re
quiring Chief Judge Parker to answer or tile any responsive plead

ing. 29 Judge Polozola reasoned that judicial immunity barred plain
tiffs' suit. Also, the Fifth Circ uit's earlier denial of mandamus

was

said t o be res judicata. Plainti ffs appealed; briefs were filed. The
United States Government, representing Judge Parker, took the
position that mandamus was the proper remedy, not a direct ac
tion ag ainst the district court. But plaintiffs had tried that route
without success. A year dra gged by. Then t he Southdowns parents
asked for an expedited hearing on their appeal. A School Board

election was set for September 11, 1982; t he gag order had now
thrown its cloak of silence over the scheduled election. Representa

tives who wanted to talk about their records could not do so fully;
voters faced the prospect of voting b lind ly ; rumors abounded. But

the Fifth Circuit would not budge. The request for an ex pedited
hearing was denied. Appellants applied for a stay of the distri ct
court's orders pending appeal, but this too w as denied. What
started out as In re Baier, and what h ad wound its way back to the

Fifth Circuit

sub

nom.

Baier

v.

Parker, came to an abrupt end

on

September 7, 1982, when the court not only denied the stay, but

ruled: "[T]reating the appeal as a petition for writ of ma ndamus ,
the petition is likewise DENIED, since the Court denied a like pe

tition for mandamus on May 11, 1981 .

.

.

. "30

This order is dizzy

ing in its effect.

A few general reflections and I'll move on. What can be said
for the future, based on this other wise un reported exampl ? Fir s
t,
e
the rec�rd shows Southdowns parents were never accord
o
an
ed
p
portumty to be heard on the merits of their claims-"
· any
not m
,
. h respect to those fund
teehn.1cal sense but wit
amen ta1 reqm·r e
ments of fairness wh"ich are of the essence o f d
ue
process ma pro·U " · 1 ·
31 g·
ceed"mg J d1c1a m na t ure. ,,
mce the cour t's first deni
al of man·

·

·

�

29 . Baier v. arker, 523 F. Supp. 2
(M.D. La. l98l).
30. In re Baier, No. 81-3622 (5th Cir. Sept. 7
1982) ( un report
ed).
31. Per Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes
rg
v . United States, 304 U.S.
1 , 19 (1938). See also Morgan v. United States 29
468, 480-81 (1936) ( r
pe
Hughes, C.J.):

�

M

: � {;�
·

·

The requirement of a "full hearing" has obvious re�
erence t o the t
.
.
.
. I
1 10n of JU
r �d't·
. d'1c1a
proceed mgs m w h'1ch ev1'dence 1s received and we·
igh d
e
by the trier of facts. The
f
afford
the sa eg uard that th
"hearing" is designed to
e on wh o d
ecides shall be bound
e
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damus can be explained on any number of grounds having nothing
to do with the merits, it is the law of the Fifth Circuit that, "we
are loath to assume that the denial of the writ [of mandamus]

with out opinion was a determination on the merits of the claimed
j urisdictional error."32 The Supreme Court of the United States
has also ruled that the denial without opinion of an extraordinary
writ "does not constitute, and cannot be fairly read as, an adjudi
cation on the merits of the claim presented."33 The court's second
peremptory denial of mandamus likewise leaves too many ques
tions of law and fact unanswered. Worse yet, it appears to us that,
under the court's ruling, citizens of Baton Rouge were deprived of
precious first and fifth amendment rights, and of the right to cast
an informed ballot, all without according them their constitutional
day in court. A total of six Circuit Courts of Appeals have held
mandamus available in circumstances similar to those confronting
the Southdowns group as a result of the district court's perpetual
gag.34 Justice required more than darkling silence from the Fifth

Circuit in the face of petitioners' claims. Citizens who have lost
their schools a11d \Yant to know why are entitled, under the first
amendment, to the fullest measure of enlightment: "Secrecy is not
congenial to truth-seeking and self-righteousness gives too slender
in good conscience to consider the evidence, to be guided by that alone, and to reach

his conclusion uninfluenced by extraneous considerations which in other fields might

have play in determining purely e xecutive action. The "hearing" is the hearing of
evidence and argument. If the one who determines the facts which underlie the order

ha s not considered evidence or argument, i t is manifest that the hearing has not been
given.
32.
33.

629 F.2d 1049, 1055 (5th Cir.1980).
421 U.S. 482, 488 (1975).
See In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (district
Key v. Wise,

Pitchess v. Davis,

34.
court order prohibiting
Parties and counsel from making any extra-judicial statements about information produced
t rou
gh discovery held a proper subject for mandamus; writ issued and order declared in
viol
ation of first amendment); United States v. Sherman, 581 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1978);
Society Professional Journalists v. Martin, 556 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 43 4
U. .
S 1022 (1978); Rogers v. United States Steel Corp. [Rogers II), 536 F.2d 1001 (3d Cir.

�

1976); CBS, Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1975) (district court's order prohibiting
Parties to a civil action from discussing the case with members of the news media or the
PUhli was
proper subject for mandamus; order declared in violation of first amendment);
c
Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970) (order of district court prohibiting defen
dants and their attorneys from making any public statements in relation to case constituted
clear
abuse of discretion and was proper subject for mandamus; district court's order de
clared
in violation of first amendment).See also Chicago Council of Lawyers v.Bauer, 522

F.2d 242 (7th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976) (federal district court's "no com
lll. ent" rules applicable to lawyers in civil litigation held in violation of the first amendment,
With the Seventh Circuit noting that "The need for informed and complete discussion ...
far o
utweighs any p ossible benefit that might accrue in terms of maintaining the laboratory
o
c nd itions of a civil trial." Id. at 258).

[Vol. 29:647
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.
"II
an assur ance of righ tness.
ended quietly in Baton
Incidentally, desegregation in the dark
Nove1?ber 22� 1982. A y�ar
Rouge at 4:05 p.m. C.S.T.on Mon day,
its gag m perpetmty,
and a half after the district court extended
: "The Court having
record
the following order was spread upon the
ded that the
considered the matter sua sponte and having conclu
exist, the or
circumstances which made them necessary no longer
amend m ents
and
ents
supplem
all
and
der dated March 11, 1981
later, the
weeks
Two
aside."
set
thereto are hereby vacated and
Baier v.
in
bane
en
Fifth Circuit denied rehearing and rehearing
Parker without a word. Of course, lifting the gag order came too
late: "Fragile First Amendment rights," the Fifth Circuit has rec
ognized, "are often lost or prejudiced by delay."38 Southdown s Ele
mentary remains closed.

Now for the other fellow's cases. In re Express Ne ws 37 held
unconstitutional Local Rule 500-2 of the United S ta t es District
Court fo r the Western District of Texas, which flatly prohibited
any person, including the press, from interviewing a n y juror con
cerning the deliberations of a jury in a criminal case. The local rule
constituted an unlawful abridgment of the first amendment right
of the press to gather news and the corollary right of the public to
receive information.The court's opinion builds on Supreme Court
precedent, principally Landmark Communications, Inc.
ginia" and Globe Newspaper Co.

v.

v.

Vir

Superior Court,39 both of

which vouchsafe the news-gathering rights of the press. "Govern
ment-imposed secrecy," said Judge Rubin, "denies the free flow of
information and ideas not only to the press but also to the pub
lic. "•0 The public's "right to ... receive" information, noted the
court, has been repeatedly recognized and applied to a vast variety
of information.41 There are countervailing considerations, however.
:Jfl Anti-Facial Committee v. McG rat h 341 U.S. 123, 171 (1951) (per Frankfurter
, J.,
rnncurrm1). See alao Juatice Brandeia'a comment: "Sunlight
is said to be the best of disin·
r�·lAnt.; electric li1ht the beet policeman." TH• WORDS
. .

,

or

JUSTICE BRANDEIS

151

(S.

l.olclman ed. 1963). Compare White Rabbit to
Alice, quoted in L. PAPER BRANDEIS 42
1191\:l): ""Public buain- OIJCht to be conducted in private because
what w do here isn't
1m1�•rlant enouah lo be made public, and private buaineta
should be made public because if
11 •�r" k•pl private the puhlic wouldn't know
about it."
:If!. Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 619 F.2d at 470.
:r; fl!lfi •'.2d H07 (flth Cir. 1982).

�

:ui

:111
40
41

4:1.'> 11 .S. 1129 (19711).
4!17 11.S. M�I (1982).
flllfl r.2d al H09.
Id At thia point Judie Rubin dropped
.

•
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Unlike Mr. Justice Black, for whom "no law" meant "no law,"42
Judges Rubin, Johnson, and Williams ally themselves with the
school that judges by balancing first amendment rights against
competing concerns. An accused's sixth amendment right to a fair
trial comes to mind. "Like other First Amendment rights, the right
to gather news is not, of course, absolute,"43 said the court. But
any rule of court blocking the free flow of information must be
"narrowly tailored to prevent a substantial threat to the adminis
tration of justice."•• The rule i n question failed this test. It swept
too broadly, being unlimited in time and scope, applying alike to
jurors anxious to talk and to those desiring privacy, and foreclosing
questions about jurors' general reactions as well as specific ques
tions about jurors' votes that might, under some compelling cir
cumstances, be inappropriate. The burden rests upon government,
and in this instance upon the district court, to justify the need for
curtailment, not the other way around: "A court may not impose a
restraint that sweeps so broadly and then require those who would
speak freely to justify special treatment by carrying the burden of
showing good caus�. "4G The first amendment is good cause enough.
In re Express News arose on mandamus, which the court, cit
ing the law of the Ninth Circuit,'8 ruled was the appropriate rem
edy. When a federal district court's rule is the subject matter in
controversy, it is generally the United States Attorney who puts up
the defense. This procedure preserves an adversarial setting while
avoiding the unseemliness of requiring the district court to defend
itself on mandamus. The appellate court was unpersuaded by the
argument that freedom of debate and independence of thought
would be jeopardized if jurors knew their arguments and ballots
total of fifteen Supreme Court cases, from Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943)
{right to receive handbills) to Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
447 U.S. 557 (1980) (advertising that promotes the
42.

use

of electricity).

S ome people would have you believe that this is a very radical position, and maybe it
is. But all I am doing is following what to me is the clear wording of the First Amend
ment that 'Congress shall make no law . . . a bridging the freedom of speech or of the
press.' These words follow Madison's admonition that there are some powers the peo
ple did not mean the federal government to have at all. As I have said innumerable
times before I simply believe that 'Congress shall make no law' means Congress shall
make no law.
Ii. BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 45 (1969).
4 3. 695 F.2d at 809.
44. Id. at 810.
45. Id.
46. United States v. Sherman, 581 F.2d 1358, 1361 (9th Cir. 1978).
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Agreeing with the Third Circuit's conclusion that the same so
cietal interests that mandate a first amendment right o f access to
criminal trials apply to pretrial criminal proceedings, the court in
United States v. Chagra48-with Judge Rubin writing-extended
this right of access to bail reduction hearings held i n court or in
other places traditionally open t o the public. The Third and Ninth
Circuits have recognized a first-amendment right to attend pretrial
suppression hearings,49 and the District of Columbia C ourt of Ap
peals has held the press and public enjoy a first amendment right
of access to pretrial detention hearings.50 True, bond reduction
hearings do not have a history o f public access; often bail is set
informally and not always in open court. But the court recognized
that history is not determinative: "[TJhe first amendment must be
interpreted in the context of current values and conditions,"51 we
are told. This utterance is one o f the most dramatic penned during
the term. The first amendment is n ot static; its meaning is not to
be cabined to the values and conditions of 1791. Recognition of a
right of access, however, does not fix the judicial scales "beyond
counterweight. "52 The court repeated its earlier observation that
the first amendment, despite its categorical language, is not an ab
solute: "There is no single divine constitutional right to whose
reign all others are subject."53 The opinion lists the circumstances
under which a trial court may lawfully exclude the press from bail
reduction hearings.a. In the instant case, the district judge prop
erly excluded the press on findings of likely prejudice and a lack of
alternatives to closure.
695 F.2d at 810.
701 F.2d 354 (5th Cir. 1983).
49. llni�ed States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1162, 1169-71 (9th
Cir. 1982); United States v.
, .
Criden,
675 F.2d 550, 555 (3d Cir.1982).
r10. U n ited States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C. 1981)
(en bane).
r11. 701 F.2d at 363.
r12. Id. at :164.
r,:1. ld. at :165.
r>4. Td. (" ( 1 ! I defendant's! right to a fair
trial will likely be prejudiced by conductin g
h h
l " :arinK pubh�ly; (2) alternatives to closure cannot
protect defendant's fair trial right;
nnd (.I) rloffure will probably be effective in protec
ting agai nst the perceived danger.")
47.

48.

_
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This Chagra case has a procedural twist worthy of note. An
appellate court is rarely presented an issue without an opponent,
but it happened here. The defendant lost interest in the case after
his guilty plea. The prosecution never supported closure. Who,
then, was there to oppose the newspapers on appeal? Moreover,
was it open to the media, though not a party to the case, to appeal
the closure order, or must the press seek other avenues of review?
The court solved the first problem by appointing an amicus curiae
to defend the decision of the district court. That was a creative
step, and under the collateral order doctrine, the court held it open
for the press to contest closure orders by taking an appeal.1111 If the
question were an open one, Judge Rubin would have required re
view by mandamus, not by i nterlocutory appeal. Mandamus is
quicker, and time is of the essence in first amendment cases.116 But
the settled adjective law of the Fifth Circuit allows both modes of
review, and the panel was obliged to fall in line.
B. Adult Theaters

To paraphrase Chief Justice Marshall only slightly, "The
power to zone is the power to destroy."117 In Basiardanes v. City of
GalvestonH the court struck down Ordinance 78- 1, which flatly
banned adult theaters from all of the central business district and
which, in its effect, squeezed Mr. Basiardanes and company into an
industrial patchwork of swamps, warehouses, and railroad tracks.
Basiardanes wanted to lease his downtown building to a movie
concern called Universal Amusements Company, an outfit that
traded in adult motion pictures that were not obscene. The pro
posed theater lay across the street from a major renovation of Gal
veston's Grand Opera House. City officials moved quickly to block
Basiardanes's efforts by passing its new ordinance which was
55. Id. at 358-60.
56. Id. at 360 n.15.
57. Or, as the Great Chief Justice put it in announcing McCulloch v . Maryland, 1 7
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819): "[T)he power t o tax involves the power to destroy"-words
that Marshall borrowed verbatim from Webster's oral argument in the case. See 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) at 327 ("An unlimited power to tax involves, necessarily, a power to destroy"). But
see Mr. Justice Frankfurter's comment, concurring in Graves v. N.Y. ex rel. O'Keefe, 306
U.S. 466, 490 (1939): "The web of unreality spun from Marshall's famous dictum was
brushed away by one stroke of Mr. Justice Holmes's pen: 'The power to tax is not the power
to destroy while this Court sits.' Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 277 U.S. 218, 223
(dissent).''
58.

682 F.2d 1203 (5th Cir. 1982 ).
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ordinance touched activity protected by the first amendmen t, viz.,
the showing of non-obscen e adult movies. Galveston , in its wisdom,
had defined "adult theater" as any theater from which children
unaccompanied by an a dult are excluded u n d er Texas law. This
bizarre scheme reduces the adult population to seeing o nly what is
fit for children, which the court thought too constr icting. "By peg
ging its definition of adult theaters to Texa s la w on obscenity for

minors, G alveston's regulation of adult thea ters sweeps broadly

into the area protected by the First Arnendment."61 American
Mi ni Theaters was not controlling, since the Galveston ordinance
not only dispersed adult theaters but effectively dro ve them off
Galveston Island altogether. 63 T he court's rejection of the alleged
crime nexus is a bold step, theoretically speaking. The mere asser
tion of a state interest is not enough. "The City m ust buttress its
assertion with evidence that the state interest has a basis in fact
and that the factual basis was consider ed by the city in passing the
ordinance. "88 Nothing i n the record indicate d to the court that Or
dinance 78-1 was passed after a weighin g of the effects of adult
thea rs on urb an life. The "empty record "6• before Galves n City
to
.
officials stood m stark contr ast to the facts
of the Detroit case.
The e the legislative recor d was laden with the
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59. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
60. See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boras,
416 U.S 1 ( 1 974).
In the Fifth Circuit, see
Stansberry v. Holmes, 613 F.2d 1 285 (5th Cir. 1980
).
61. 682 F.2d at 1213.
62. Id. at 1213-14.
63. Id. at 1215.
·

64.

Id.

.

.
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to speak, in each instance by the testimony of experts.811 But surely
the court is right, in this case, to probe the motives of city officials.
Both the timing of the ordinance and its history pretty plainly
show that the real reason Galveston objected to the proposed thea
ter was its location next to the Grand Opera House, not its nexus
to crime. Protection of the Opera House is a legitimate goal, said
the court, but it is not one with the same weight as safe streets,
"nor is it one that entitles the City to squelch free speech. "66 Ordi
nance 78-1 also unconstitutionally suppressed Biasiardanes's free
dom to advertise. All he wanted to do was to hang a sign saying
"ADULT THEATER" on his facade-a harmless gesture, rea
soned the court. Commercial speech, once excluded from first
amendment coverage, now enjoys constitutional protection.67 Ban
ning all advertising of adult theaters, regardless of content, goes
too far. Nothing in Basiardanes's simple sign depicted the "cellu
loid delights" within the theater; he was therefore entitled to nom
inal damages-no actual damages having been shown-for breach
of his first amendment right to advertise.68 The court noted, how
ever, that under Carey v. Phiphus ,89 a case that every civil liberties
lawyer would do well to read, attorneys' fees awards may be sup
ported by an award of nominal damages. The court also remanded
for trial on the claim of lost lease revenues, since there was evi
dence in

the

record of some

actual injury to

Basiardanes's

pocketbook. 70

65.

Cf.

Tobacco Accessories v. Treen, 6 8 1 F.2d 378, 380 n.2 (5th Cir. 1982) (sustaining

Louisiana's Drug Paraphernalia Law, which was patterned after the Model Drug Parapher
nalia Act drafted by the United States Department of Justice. Judge Politz's opinion, which
upholds Louisiana's Paraphernalia Law, quoted extensively from Congressional hearings
and from the statement of a United States Deputy Assistant Attorney General in support of
the Model Act).
66.

682 F.2d at 1 2 16.

67.

See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).

Cf. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981).

68.

682 F.2d at 1219-20.

69.

435 U.S. 247, 257 n.11 (1978). See generally Note, Promoting the Vindication of

Civil Rights Through the Attorney's Fees Awards Act, 80 CoLUM. L. REV. 346 (1980). Closer

to home, readers interested in exploring the matter of the fee should have a look at Judge
Rubin's opinion for the court in Knighton

v.

Watkins, 616 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1980), which

holds too low a $30 per hour fee under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1988 (1976 and Supp. V. 1981); $50 per hour was more reasonable, said the court.
70.

682 F.2d at 1220 n.22.
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II.

FOURTH AMENDMENT

A.

Dog Sniffing in the Schools
There is more to

Horton

v.

Goose Creek Ind.

Scho?l. District'1

Actually, two Horton opm10ns were
handed down during the term, some five months apart. Hort n I,n
than first meets the eye.

?
craftsmansh� p. �y

decided on June 1, 1982, is first-rate judicial

that I mean it treats the question presented-whether a dog s smff
is a "search"-with a freshness of approach and wi th breathtaking
dexterity. I realize that comparisons are invidious, but those whose
lives have been touched by the work of John Minor Wisdom will
doubtless excuse my praising him here by reference to his Horton
opinions. There is much to learn about the judicial process behind
these two slip opinions.

Horton

I held that the sniff of a drug-detecting dog "must be

recognized as a search governed by the fourth amendment. "73 Lit
tle did it matter to Wisdom, J., that a mountain of authorities,
including the Second and Seventh Circuits, had reached the con
trary conclusion. What mattered most to the panel-Judges Ran
dall and Tate sat aside their brother-was reasoning, not recital of
authority. The decided cases were confused theoretically, said the
panel, and in the face of this confusion the court was hesitant to
extend the rule that canine sniffing is not a s earch to dragnet snif
fing operations in the schools "simply on the basis of precedent.""
Instead, Judge Wisdom chose to "analyze the p roblem afresh and
determine whether the sniffing offends reasonable expectations of
privacy."711 To say that Judge Wisdom's opinion thoroughly can
vasses the authorities-rejecting some, building on others-is not
to do him, and presumably his clerks, justice. One can only marvel
at the case law surgically dissected in the opinion and in the notes.
The panel rejects the analog

� to a police officer smelling marijuana

smoke. Some courts say a smffing dog is no different from a human
being, or they say the dog's olfactory sense merely "enhances " the
senses of the policeman, i n the same way a flashlight enhan ces
71. 690 F.2d 470 (5th Cir.1982) (on petition for
rehearing ) cert. denied 103 S Ct
.
3536 (1983).
72. 677 F.2d 471 (5th Cir. 1982 ) (per Wisdom, J.,
Randall and Tate, JJ.).
73. Id. at 480.
74. Id. at 477.
75. Id. at 477-78.
,

·

'

.
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sight.76 Of course, this is a fals e analogy. "Nick's nose did not en
hance Detective Berks's senses; it replaced them," the Ninth Cir
cuit opined shortly before Horton I came down.77 Judge Wisdom
says of the same false analogy: "We find this reasoning unpersua
sive. "78 Here is judging, let it be said, in the grand manner. The
sniffing of a dog is unquestionably different from the sniffing of a
human being; otherwise law enforcement agencies would not invest
resources in training the animals. Judge Wisdom describes drug
sniffing dogs as "giant olfactory nerves,"79 and his figure certainly
fits the facts. The dog permits the officer to detect data otherwise
imperceptible to human senses, and, unlike flashlights, drug-snif
fing dogs are generally not in use in society. Therefore, on reason
ing, if not authority, the court held the sniff a search. 80
But there is something very unsettling about the opinion in
Horton I. One of the authorities listed among those whose reason
ing the panel questions is United States v. Goldstein,8 1 which, sur

prisingly, turns out to be an earlier panel decision of the same
Fifth Circuit. Doubtless Judge Wisdom's attempt to distinguish
Goldstein and his criticism of its reasoning stirred up the col
leagues. Five months later, on petition for rehearing, Horton I was
withdrawn and Horton II was substituted in its place. In the Fifth
Circuit no panel is free to disregard earlier decisions, however sus
pect their reasoning.82 On rehearing, Judge Wisdom was obliged to
follow Goldstein and follow it he did: "We find Goldstein to be
controlling on the question of whether the dogs' sniffing of student
lockers in public hallways and automobiles parked on public park
ing lots was a search."83 It thus continues to be the law in the Fifth
76. See, e.g., United States v. Goldstein, 635 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 452
U.S. 962 (198 1 ).
77. United States v. Beale, 674 F.2d 1327, 1333 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated and re
manded, 103 S. Ct. 3529 (1983) (for reconsideration in light of United States v. Place, 103 S.
Ct. 2637 (1983)).
78. 677 F.2d at 478.
79. Id.
80. Id . at 480.
81. 635 F.2d at 356 (per Frank M. Johnson, J., Kravitch and Allgood, JJ.).
82. As Judge Tate has pointed out, the Fifth Circuit follows "the strict circuit prece
dent policy, which requires all subsequent panels to follow even an isolated earlier panel
precedent until it is overruled by en bane consideration . . . . " Tate, The Last Year of the
"Old" Fifth (1891 -1981), 27 Lov. L. REV. 689, 690 (1981) (citing Spinkellink v. Wainright,
596 F.2d 637, 638 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Evans, 572 F.2d 455, 477 n.23 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 870 (1978)).
83. 690 F.2d at 477 (per curiam). That Horton II was handed down per c�iam is
further evidence the panel was bowing to the Fifth Circuit's iron-clad rule of stare decisis.
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reasoning in law. One need only read the latest
preme Court on the matter of dog sniffing to realize the value of
thinking in print to sound judgme nt. The canine sniff is sui
generis, says the Court, in one fleeting paragraph o f obiter that as
suredly will control the future.u It is now the law of the
land-unfortunately without the benefit of briefing or oral argu
ment-that canine sniffing of luggage is not a "search" within the
meaning of the fourth amendment. For what it's worth, this lowly
surveyor prefers the craftsmanship of Horton I.
Of course, sniffing a person is quite different from sniffing a
locker, in terms of its general offensiveness and one's expectation
of privacy. Judge Wisdom has made it clear, and there is no disa
greement about it, that dragnet sniffing of students in the schools
6
is a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment.8 On this
point, the Fifth Circuit stands in unison against the law of the Sev
enth Circuit, and justifiably so. "We need only look at the record
in this case to see how a dog's sniffing technique-i. e . , sniffing
around each child, putting his nose on the child and scratching and
manifesting other signs of excitement in the case o f an alert-is
intrusive," said the court in Horton Il.87 Certainly, the thought of
.
a Dober an pmscher marching up and down the aisles of my
.
daughter s sixth grade class and poking its nose up against her
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strikes me as frightening. It will take more than the fiction of
loco

in
parentis, which Judge Wisdom expressly rejects,88 to convince

this parent that dog sniffing in the schools is all right. But one
parent's personal view, even a judge's for that matter, is not the
test. Under the fourth amendment, the test is reasonableness.
Drawing an analogy to

Terry

v.

Ohio, the opinion in Horton II goes

on to apply a balancing approach whereby the intrusiveness of the
search is weighed against the need for information, and a standard
of "reasonable cause" based on individualized suspicion is laid
down.89 "The intrusion on dignity and personal security that goes
with the type of canine inspection of the student's person involved
in this case cannot be justified by the need to prevent abuse of
drugs and alcohol when there is no individualized suspicion, and
we hold it unconstitutional. "90 Thus, in the Fifth Circuit, the
fourth amendment has not gone entirely to the dogs. And even
locker-sniffing dogs, under

Horton II, must be "reasonably relia

ble," a matter that was left open on remand for development of an
olfactory record.91 The Supreme Court denied certiorari92 in
ton II, and there the matter rests.
III.
A.

Hor

OF LIBERTY AND PROPERTY
Dress Codes in the Schools
First a word about beards g enerally. Socrates, who was a great

teacher, wore one.98 But he lived in a different time , at a different
place. Charles Evans Hughes, undoubtedly the greatest Chief Jus
tice in the twentieth century up to now, wore one. It was a matter
88. Id. at 480 n.18.
89. Id. at 481.
90. Id. at 481 -82.
91. Id. at 482.
92. 103 S. Ct. 3536 (1983).
93. Reginald Reynolds in his painstaking history of beards says, apropos "Of the
Beard Philosophic":
Pliny speaks of the respect and fear inspired by the beard of Euphrates, a Syrian
philosopher, and Strabo says much the same of the bearded Gymnosophists. The
as long a beard as Socrates
good a philosopher, survived into the shaven age. Of such beards

Beard Philosophic, whereby every man could grow
deemed himself

as

the younger Pliny wrote when he praised that of the philosopher Euphrates . . . a
philosopher without a bearde was very lyttell estemed.
R. REYNOLDS, BEARDS: THEIR SOCIAL STANDING, RELIGIOUS INVOLVEMENT, DECORATIVE Pos
SIBILITIES, AND VALUE IN OFFENSE AND DEFENSE THROUGH THE AGES 4 0 (1949) (emphasis in
original).
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in Rapide s Parish, Louisiana.

I'm told by friends that life is different in Rapides Parish
from , say, life in New Orleans . Perhaps this explains why the
Rapides School Board, in its wisdom, voted to apply its Student
Dress Code to all employees in the system, from janitors and bus
drivers on up to tenured teachers. Judge Thornberry's opinion in
Damico v. Rapides Parish School Board96 sustain e d the School
Board's policy against beards as a "reasonable mea n s o f furthering
the school board's undeniable interest in teaching hygiene, instil
ling discipline, asserting authority, and compelling u niformity."97
But doubts linger. True, a decade ago in Karr v. Schmidt,98 the
Fifth Circuit held en bane that hygiene, discipline, asserting au

thority, a n d compelling uniformity are legitimate c oncerns of the
school board. But Karr trimmed students' hair, not teachers'. And
in t he Lansdale v. Tyler Junior College99 case, again e n bane, the
court reasoned that the right o f junior college students to choose
their mode of personal hair grooming was within "the great host of
liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from arbitrary
!ltate action. " 1 00 Thus college students are free to wea r their hair as
they see fit in the Fifth Circuit. I n 1 975, in the Handler v. San
Jacin t o Ju nior College 101 case, a nother panel applied the reasoning
of /,ansd.a le to strike down a junior college's regulat ion prohibiting

the wearin g of beards among faculty. "School author
ities may reg
u late teache rs' appearance and activit ies only when
regulation
the

!l·I.
%.
!M;
!17
!IH
·�1
· ·

llM)

1111

1 . M . l'l lst:v, <'llAKl. I:� EVANH HUGHE S 377
( 1 95 1 ).
I I Id. n t tili6.
i;7;, r.�rl 100, ri·h 'ii d1•nird 680 F.2d 1
389 (5th Cir. 1982).
/rl. n l 1 02
·Ifill F . '.!d tim 1 :,th Cir. 1 97 2 ) (en bane)
, cert. denie d' 409 '1
'- · S . 989 ( 1972) .
·l<O F · -· • 't f'".J
'<
' h Cir. 1 9 7 .2
( .Jt
) (en hanc) , cert. denied' 4 1 1 U ' S
986 ( 1973)
/<I. At fifi:I
:. i • i F ·� ct "7:1 l !'1 th C'ir. 1 97!'1 ) .
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has some relevance to legitimate administrative or educational
fun ctions," said the Handler court.102 "The mere subjective belief
in a particular idea by public e mployers is, however, an undeniably

insufficient justification for the infringement of a constitutionally
gua ranteed rig ht. "103 The Handl er court thought it "illogical to
co nclude that a teacher's bearded appearance would jeopardize his
repu tation or pedagogical effectiveness with college students
"1 04 One wonders what the connection is, in point of fact, be
tween the Rapides Parish School Board's ban of beards on all of its
•

•

•

•

employees and any educational aim? Certainly Socrates's example

suggests that one can wear a b eard and still teach effectively. Chief
Justice Hughes's beard, if anything, added to his authority. What
kind of beard are we talking about? A neatly trimmed Vandyke
would seem to pose no threat to personal hygiene. And to say that
requiring a b us driver in Rapides Parish to shave his beard will
pro mote discipline sounds preposterous. Whose discipline are we
talking about anyway, the students or the employees? That is
never made clear in the discussion. Focusing a trifle harder on the
purposes of the rule and its relation, genuine or not, to the aims of
th e school board may expose weakness lying only slightly beneath
th e surface of what appears to be rubber-stamp analysis.
This latest hair case falls somewhere in between the estab
lish ed precedents. It concerns the liberty of adults, not children.
B ut the context is the grade and high school, not the junior college.
Generally w hen a court is caught in the middle of its own holdings

finer lines will have to be drawn. But in Domico u. R a pides Parish
�ho ol Board, Judge Thornberry distinguishes Handl er, which he
J o ined, on the basis of what he perceives to be a n established
"b
right line" app licable to hair cases between the high school door
and the college gate. "[l]n the public elementary and secondary
sch oo
ls, such regulations are always justified b y the school's
need
s,"1015 says the court, but the opinion never explains why. We
are told
the school board has made "a quite rational determination
to liniit its
emp loyees' choice of hairstyle, and we therefore will not

�

102.

Id. at 277.

104.

Id.

loa.
8

1 05.

Id.
675 F.2d at 102. But see Wilkinson & White, Constitutional Protections For Per
62 CORNELL L. REV. 563, 605-06 (1977) ("But proper due process analysis

hollQl Lifestyles,

p�tdly stops with the abstract finding of a legitimate state interest. Where regulation im011ll�es constitutional right-here, that of appearance-the means chosen by the state
on a

g t significantly to further the announced state objectives.").
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leaves the main que stion in the
intervene,"' oe but again this
een the challenged rule and its
case-the relationship betw
107
whi ch is quoted but not
Joh nson,
aims- una nswered. Kelley v.
, and therefore distinguishable.
discusse d, is a policeman's hair case
hers generally wear what they
Police wear uniforms; tenured teac
emphasized: "Th e overwhelm
ist
nqu
please. In Kelley, Justice Reh
e of the pres ent day are uni
ing majority of state and local polic
about apply ing student dress
formed ."108 Kelley said nothin g at all
codes to adult teachers.
ry, a Seventh
The only other case relied on by Judge Thornber
Steve ns, is also dis
C ircuit opini on 109 by then Judge (now Justice)
ns expressly re
Steve
Judge
t.
respec
l
tinguishable, and in a crucia
or exposure
dress
of
form
c
served the question whether "a specifi
e
cited
among
h
and
may be required or totally prohibited,"no
other instances of "intolerable required conform ity"m the official
prohibition of beards during the reign of Peter the Great.112 The
Domico opinion ends by quoting the following passage from the
law of the Seventh Circuit:
If a school board should correctly conclude that a teacher's style of
dress or plumage, has an adverse impact on the educational process,
and if that conclusion conflicts with the teacher's interest in select
ing his

lifestyle, we have no doubt that the interest of the

own

teacher is subordinate to the public interest.113

T �e key word, of course, is " correctly," and while all would agree
with Judge Thornberry that " [t]he same may be said about other
school system employees, such as bus drivers,""" some may per 106.
107.
108

:1�
1 1 1.

I !:.!.

675 F.2d at 102.

425 U.S. 238 ( 1 976).

Id. at 248.
�i i�:

� ���1 District No. 167, Cook County, Ill., 495 F.2d 658 (7th Cir. 1974).
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ceive that the quotation begs the very question at issue. There is a
fleeting reference to "the evidence below,"m but what it shows no
where appears in the opinion. With all respect, the Domico opinion
jumps too quickly to its conclusion; nor is it clear that Fifth Cir
cuit case law, or the controlling law of the Supreme Court, "com
pels" 11 6 the court's two-page affirmance. Damico therefore is a case
that shows how resorting to bright lines often risks obscuring real
difficulties.
B.

Public Employment and Procedural Due Process

Shawgo

v.

Spradlin 117 rejects both a procedural and substan

tive due process challenge to the temporary suspensions of two
Amarillo police officers, and the permanent demotion from ser
geant to patrolman of one of them. Their cohabiting together
outside marriage was in violation of catch-all department rules
proscribing conduct that "if brought to the attention of the public,
could result in justified unfavorable criticism of that member or
the department. "118 This is a very hard case on its facts because
other Amarillo police officers commonly engaged in the same prac
tice without penalty, and the conduct in question was expressly
approved by a supervisor of one of the officers. Moreover, Judge
Tate's opinion for the court recognizes that the actual conduct for
which the officers were punished-dating and spending the night
together-"is not self-evidently within the ambit of the regulations
and thus does not carry with it its own warning of wrongdoing
" 119 Judge Tate's opinion is admirably candid, and, as is
characteristic of his work, he bends over backwards to emphasize
the strengths of the losing side. That is good judging, if I may say
so of a friend's work. But the net result in this case strikes me as
perilously wrong.
•

•

•

•

To punish police officers, whose records are otherwise spotless,
for off-duty dating that they have no reason to believe is wrong
and for love-making in private that they have been told is all right
seems unjust-procedurally gross, if you will-in terms of elemen-

and

115.

Id.

116.

Id. at 103.

701 F.2d 470 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 404 ( 1983) (Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun, JJ., dissenting from the denial of cert.).
118. Id. at 473.

117.

119.

Id. at 478.
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fair warning before discipline or
tary due process, which requires
it go along with this?
Circu
discharge. Why should the Fifth
v. Spra dlin as the un
The answer lies in recognizing Shawgo
Bishop v. Wood,120 a
of
legacy
ised,
fortunate and I think ill-adv
d down in 1976. In
hande
five-to-fo r opinion of the Supreme Court
emplo yment per
public
Bishop a majority of the Court held that
sonnel decisions, even mistake n ones, implicate no constit utionally
protected liberty interest; absent a protected propert y state inter

�

est, personnel decisions are outside the ken of federal judicial re
view. Thus, in his peroration for the Court Justice Stevens says:
The federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review
the multitude of personnel decisions that are made daily by public
agencies. We must accept the harsh fact that numerous individual
mistakes are inevitable in the day-to-day administration of our af
fairs. The United States Constitution cannot feasibly be construed
to require federal judicial review for every such error. In the absence
of any claim that the public employer was motivated by a desire to
curtail or to penalize the exercise of an employee's constitutionally
protected rights, we must presume that official action was regular
and, if erroneous, can best be corrected in other ways. The Due Pro
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not a guarantee against
incorrect or ill-advised personnel decisions.121

Judge Tate quotes this passage in Shawgo; he also emphasizes that
"the underlying conduct-cohabitation or romantic involvement
between a s ubo rdinate and superior officer-was within the scope
of state personnel regulations and not independeQtly protected by
th e Constitution,"121 a conclusion that is certainly suggested by
Kelley v. Johnson.ua The right of privacy, particularly a police
man's privacy, i s not unquali fied. Most observers would agree with
J udge Tate when he says there exists "a rational connection be
tween th e exi gencies of Department discipline and forbidding
members of a q uasi mil ita ry unit, especially those different in
rank, to sh are an apartment or to cohabit."12• But what about the
claim of lack of warning?
-

?n t h is issue it is no answer to quote Bishop v. Wood. The re

the Court never reached the question of what proc e ss is due, since
l '.ll>
121
I ''"
I :.!:I
1 :14

·1:.!t; l l S :14 1 1 1!176).
Id a t :14!1 . �>ll <f1•1lnoteo omitted ) .
/ I l l F . :1cl Al 419.
4 'i�1 I 1 . S . 2:111, 244 4!1 ( 1 976).
/Ill F �d • l 411:1
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neither "property" nor "liberty" interests, according to the Su
preme Court, were at stake. However, in this Shawago case, the
court acknowledged the presence of a constitutionally protected
property interest under Texas civil service law, requiring cause for
demotion, and demotion by due process: "The permanency of the
personnel action and the substantial loss of benefits inherent in a
demotion . . . support the employee's reasonable expectation of
continued status unless cause exists for demotion; these factors
create a legitimate claim of entitlement protected by the Due Pro
cess clause." 1 211 Once constitutional entitlement enters a case, due
process requires fair warning. To this observer, the catch-all regu
lations as applied provided no warning at all.
Of course police officers should not live together in sin, and
chiefs of police should make that clear in their regulations. But it
is quite another thing to approve off-duty dating and love making
and then, without warning, to punish after the fact. Judge Tate,
again with admirable candor, recognizes the unfairness of it all,
and he repeatedly emphasizes the availability of state judicial
review:
The circumstances under which Whisenhunt was demoted may
not seem 'fair' to us as judges, and we may hope that state judicial
review affords a remedy for such unfairness as is perceived by us.
Nevertheless, a federal court must heed the dictates of federalism
that, where there is not an independently protected constitutional
right, a federal .c ourt is not 'the appropriate forum in which to re
view the multitude of personne l decisions that are
public agencies.'126

made

daily by

Judge Tate quotes Bishop u. Woo d 's peroration, to the effect that
the United States Constitution is not a shield against incorrect
Personnel decisions of state agencies. But, respectfully, the Due
Process Clause has always been i nterpreted as a shield against pro
cedural arbitrariness writ large, and nothing in Bishop u. Wood
forecloses recognition that in public employment cases, where con
stitution al entitlements are at stake, federal courts remain free
to vouchs afe public employees against fundamentally unfair modes
of govern mental action. There are enough "cracks in the 'new
Property' "-to
use
Professor
Van
Alstyne's
felicitous
125.
126.

Id. at 476.
Id. at 478 (citing Bishop

v.

Wood, 426 U.S. at 349-50).
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further fede ral cour t erosi on of fed·
fi ure121_ without the need for
cial re view may prove a f�lse
e al d ue process guarantees. State judi
.
the panel, Sha wgo v. Spra dlin 1s a
hope. With great resp ect to
.
hard case of missed opp ortunity

;

C.

Taxpayer Due Process
Daniel R. Rutherfor d , pro se mind you, won his and Mrs.

Rutherford's case128 against the Internal Reve nue Service during
the term, and Judge Johnson's bold opinion for the court deserves
a word of praise. The complaint sketched a por trait of palpably
unfounded tax over-assessment, lawless vendetta, and mental har·
assment on the part of an IRS agent by the name of Kuntz. The
Rutherfords sought money damages for mental anguish, recovery
of legal fees needlessly expended in fighting off the IRS, and puni·
tive damages. The trial court dismissed the complaint ruling that
available administrative procedure for recovery of tax over-assess·

,

ments is sufficient due process. On appeal, the court reversed, in
effect creating a Bivens-type129 tort action for taxpayer harass·
ment. Characterizing the interests asserted as "an attempt to lay
claim not to a property interest, but to a liberty interest derived
from and protected by the substantive aspects of the due process
clause,"130 Judge Johnson reasoned that t h e remedy suggested by
the trial court is not responsive to the w r ong stated in the com·
127. Van Alsytne, Cracks in "The New Property": Adjudicative Due Process in the
Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 455, 487 (1977) wherein Professor Van Alstyne
argues that "liberty" as used in the due process clause shou d be d efi ned to meI ude freedom
.
f�om arb1�rary ad'JUd'1c�tlve proce dures or freedom from governmental adjudication of indi·
v1dual claims by unrel�able means. But see H itian Refugee Center
v. Smith, 676 F . 2d 1023
�
.
_
(5th Cir. 1982), wherem the court, albeit
findmg a minimal e ntitlement sufficient to invoke
the guarantee of due p�ocess, was careful to point out that:
the Supreme Court s current mode of analysis in proced
ura I d ue process cases fore·
. .
.
closes recognition of a substantive entitlement to freedom
from governmentaI proce.
.
dural arb1trarmess. . . . For now at least' an individual h as
no const1tutlonaI freedom
.
from fundamentally unfair modes of governmental action
the threatened depr1vat1 0n
of wh1ch wouId trigger procedural due process protecti o n
Id. at 1037 n.30 (citation omitted). The Haitian R e''ug
' d
' ee s.court struck down exped1te
processing of Ha1tJan asyIum claims because "the governme n t
. .
.
created cond1t1ons
which ne·
.
gated the possibility that a Haitian's asylum hearmg would
.
.
.
'
be meaning
fuI m either its t1m·
ing or nature." Id. at 1040.
.
128. R�therford v. United States, 701 F.2d 580 (5th Cir. 19
83)
.
129. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 38S
197 l) (recogmzmg a federal
cause of action for damages where federal narcotics agen ts
a e a warrantless search and
arrest of the petitioner without probable cause and in viola t�
ion of the fourth amendme nt).
130. 702 F.2d at 583.
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plaint. "In the language of procedural due process, it provides the
Rutherfords no ' opportunity to be heard' on their allegations that
Kuntz violated their constitutional rights."131 Because a refund
proceeding is not the process that is due, the court reversed the

trial court's decision that available judicial and administrative pro
ceedings satisfy the fifth amendment's guarantee of due process.
Curiously, the court in

Rutherford left open the question

whether the substantive aspects of the due process clause create in
taxpayers a liberty interest in freedom from malicious harassment
"of the kind, degree and effect"132 as that attributed to agent
Kuntz. "Implication of nontextual substantive rights from the gen
eral monitions of the due process clause is a matter not to be un
dertaken lightly,"133 cautioned the court. Since the matter of sub
stantive right had been neither briefed nor argued, it was left open
for initial decision, by the district court. Judge Johnson's ap
proach-deciding on what process is due while at the same time
pretermitting the question of substantive right-is contrary to the
analysis suggested in Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth
and its offspring. 134 The usual approach is to determine, first,
whether liberty or property ·interests are at stake, and only then to
cons ider what process is due. Coming at these questions in reverse
order leaves the reader, not to mention Mr. and Mrs. Rutherford,
hanging. What appears a signal victory for the harassed taxpayer
may prove, on remand, an empty dictum. We shall see.
D.

Regulating Doctors

The court in Maceluch v. Wysongm perceived a rational basis
for legislative differentiation between doctors of medicine and doc
tors of osteopathy. The latter emphasize manipulative therapy

rather than the use of surgery or drugs in health care. The court
reasoned
that two schools of medicine, even if they differ only in
the i
r advocacy of differing philosophical approaches to the same
sc.ientific realities, "present a difference that a legislature may note
Without unlawfully discriminating against one, or preferring one
13 1 .
132.

Id. at 584 .

Id.

Id.
134 . 408 U.S. 564 (1971). See also Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 2 1 5 (1976); Bishop v .
00d ,
426 U.S. 341 (1976). Accord Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
133.

W

135.

680 F.2d 1062 (5th Cir. 1982).
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over the other. " 1 36 Hence there was nothing u nconsti tutional about
requiring doctors of osteopathy to u ti l i z e t he designati �m "D.O."
_

.

M . D. " following their names m c on n ec
tion with professional practice. C on tro l l i n g the designation under
which physicians may practice is a form of economic regulation,
rather than the familiar

"

·

said the court; furthermore, "the 'right' to be a d m i tted to a profes·
sion, including medicine, is not fun dam en t a l per se in the con s titu

·

tional sense. "137 Absent constitutiona lly p ro tecte d in terests, Jud ge
Higginbotham is surely wise to eschew t h e role of super-medical
board in the guise of judicial review:
A federal court decree is clean, swift, and d i ffic u l t to overturn. Its
powers attract those who have lost in the rough and tumble of legis
lative politics, but its power is undemocrat i c and antimajoritarian .
Accordingly, the rationale for the exercise of jud icial power requires,
at the least, that the 'constitutional' interest impi nged by the legis
lature be one traceable to the Constitutio n . The Court has no veto.
That belongs to the governor. And saying it is the Constitu tion that
vetoes does not make it so.138

Rem oval of Clinical Privileges

E.

Tenured medical school professors
they

profess,

usually

by

way of

generally p r acti ce what

clinical

pri v ileges .

Daly

v.

Sprague 139 l�aves in doubt whether these p rivileges rise to the level
.
of const1tut1onally protected "property" i n the Roth sense of the

viz., "To have a property interest in a benefit, a person
clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He
must have more �han a unilateral expectation of it. He m ust, in·
.
ste �d, h �':e a legitimate claim of entitleme n t to i t . " uo Justice Ste w
art s op1mon for the C ourt in Roth goes o n to say that,

word,

Property interests, of course, are not create
d by the Constituti on.
Rather, they are created and their dimen
si
·
on
s are defi ne d by ex.
1stmg ru1es or understandmgs that stem from
an 1nd epen d ent source
sue h as state law-ru les or understandings th
a t secure certam bene.
fits and that support claims of entitlement t o th
ose bene fi ts. u 1
·

·

-

·

136.

Id. at 1066.

137.

Id. at 1065.

138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. at 1069-70.
675 F.2d 716 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied
103 s
Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
'

Id.

·

Ct. 1448 ( 1983 ).
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Regardless of what one thinks of Justice Stewart's idea that
property interests are not created by the Constitution, which some
commentators think a dubious proposition, 142 certainly the Fifth
Circuit is obliged to follow the law-however well or poorly the
Supreme Court declares it. Thus, the Fifth Circuit has said "we
look to state law for the existence of a property interest."143 Judge
Randall's opinion for the court in Daly v. Sprague is exemplary
not only i n terms of carefully following the law, but also in terms
of forcefully laying it out. There is something powerful and inexo
rable about Carolyn Randall's opinions for the court. Daly is a fine
example of no-nonsense writing in the reports. Substantively, the
court acknowledges that possession of medical staff privileges may
constitute a property interest protected against arbitrary depriva
tion. But the record in Da ly-note well ye lawyers-was too sparse
to satisfy plaintiff's burden of showing constitutional entitlement.
The record was barren of facts showing that Daly's clinical privi
leges were analogous to medical staff privileges, or that there was
any explicit written or oral agreement which created an entitle
ment to these privileges. "We do not intimate that clinical privi
leges could not rise to the level of a constitutionally protected
property interest; we only say that, in this case, Daly did not meet
his burden of presenting facts t o show that a property interest ex
isted."1" Thus, Daly is a case that turns on a failure of proof. Al
though in fairness to the licked lawyer, not to mention future cli

ents, one wonders what kind of proof would satisfy Judge Randall.

Likewise Dr. Daly did not demonstrate the existence of a lib
erty interest by his claim that removal of clinical privileges dam
aged his reputation. There was no "stigma-plus" as is required

Under both the Supreme Court's opinion in Pau l v. Davis10 and
the Fifth Circuit's holding in Moore v. Otero 146 Dr. Daly retained
his professorship throughout the incident in question, and he suf
fered no " drastic change in status " by reason of the temporary re
.

moval of clinical privileges after he indicated he would be unavail

able due to his wife's illness. 147 On his return from voluntary leave,
his clinical privileges were quickly restored. "Any alleged damage
142.
( 197 7
).

See Monaghan, Of "Liberty " and "Property," 62 CORNELL L. REV. 405, 434-39

143.

675 F.2d at 727 (citing Moore

144.

675 F.2d at 727.

145.

424 U.S. 693, 700-1 1 (1976).

146.
147 .

675 F.2d at 728.

v.

Otero, 557 F.2d 435, 437 (5th Cir. 1977)).

557 F.2d 435, 437 (5th Cir. 1977).
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not see pati ents or because he
to reputatio n because Daly could
ry loss of priv ileges does not
pora
would be forc ed to reveal the tem
court reasoned. All was not lost,
implicate a liberty interest, "148 the
the trial cour t for its unex
however 1 as Judg e Randall reversed
first amen dme nt claim. Dr.
plained failure to consider plaintiff's
forbade him from com
gue
Spra
Daly also alleged that defen dant
a resul t, he was unable
as
municating with his patients, and that,
an. These alle
to participate in a consultation with another p hysici
rns which are
gations, the court ruled, "raise first amendment conce
rty inter
or
prope
liberty
a
of
nce
not depen dent upon the existe
was
there
claim
a
state
to
est." 1411 Summary judgment for failure
and
ions,
the
fore improp er as to Daly's first amendment allegat
and
discov
briefing
ental

supplem
for
matter
the
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court remand
merits
of
the
n
o
tion
considera
trier's
the
for
ery, if necessary, and
Daly's first amendment claim.
IV.
A.

SC07T

v.

MOORE1w

42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)

Here is the term's most spectacular case: en bane, one of the
Old Fifth's last; a divided court on a perplexing question of law
and history; two principal opinions, one by Judge Charles Clark for
fourteen members of the court, now the law of the Circuit from the
pen of its new Chief; a dissent for eight judges authored jointly by
Judges Rubin and Williams, scholars both; and separate dissenting
opinions by Judges Anderson and Garwood. At first glance, the
facts of the case suggest nothing more than mob violence against
nonunion construction workers along Alligator Bayou near Port
A �th �r , Te �as. This is not meant to excuse the busting of heads
w1 �h t�on pipe, only to ask what this assault and battery case is
? omg m f�deral court. The late Mr. Justice Harlan once put a sim
il ar question to then Solicitor General Thurgood Marshall during
th e oral argument of United States v. Guest:11n "Could the Con 
gress mak e the murdering of a Negro a federal crime ?"1�2 Solicitor
l ·IK.
1 ·l�I

Id
I cl .
llHO

F . "d !17!1 1 :1th ('ir. 1 911:.!) ( e n bane).
:11<:1 I ! S. 7.1:1 1 l !Hili ) .
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f
1 :.�� Th•· ' 1 1 1 " 1 " ' inri ; , from t h e Kound record'
ing o the argument, No 65, Oct. ,ferm
, .. 1 '"'"' I :-i· l n l ••• '" .
l . H .. .,
< . 111•• t . AfKllrd Nov 9 1 96�
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General Marshall said no, based on his understanding of control
ling law. But a lot of law, not to mention legal history, has gone
over the damn since then, beginning with the Guestu3 case itself in
1966. At bottom, what is ultimately at stake in Scott v. Moore is
nothing less than the proper allocation of judicial authority be
tween the courts of the Union and the courts of the States.
In barest outline, the essentials are these: First, the Recon
struction Congress that passed the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, in
cluding section 2 of the original act, 154 was pretty plainly worried
about massive, military-like political terrorism on the part of the
rogues in white sheets in the postbellum South. Negroes were mur
.
dered not because they were black, but because they were Republi
cans-a point that has been lost to history. m The ultimate goal of
stitutional law at the LSU Law School. For further details, see Baier, Wha t Is the Use of a

Law Book Without Pictures or Convers a t ions?, 34 J. LEGAL Eouc.
(1984)
(forthcoming).
153. 383 U.S. 745 ( 1 966), of which Professor Alfred Avins has said: " [T]he United
__

States Supreme Court has turned history inside out. . . . (T]he Guest case is so wide of the
mark that it would be necessary to burn all of the Congressional Globes in the nation to
support it." Avins, The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871: Some Reflected Light on State Action

and the Fourteenth Amendment, 11 ST. Loms U.L.J. 331, 381 (1967). See generally Kelly,
Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SuP. CT. REV. 1 19.
154. Codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (Supp. V 1981).

155. Common citizens, too, were the object of Klan violence when they supported the
Republicans-thus, both whites and blacks who voted Republican were visited by
Klansmen; contrariwise, voters of both races were left alone when they supported Demo
crats. It was not therefore race but party affiliation that singled a voter out for Klan atten

ti on. To prove this "political" motive for Klan terrorism, Congressman Stoughton (R.
Mich.) quoted the testimony of James Boyd, a confederate veteran and Klansman, before
the Joint Ku Klux Klan Investigating Committee of 1871:
Question. What is your knowledge of the object and extent of this organization

[the White Brotherhood] throughout the State [North Carolina]?
Answer. Their object was the overthrow of the reconstruction policy of Congress and

the disfranchisement of the negro.
Question. Were there any whippings in the county?
Answer. Yes, sir. I believe there were one hundred or one hundred and fifty in the

last two years in the county, white and black.
CoN G. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 320 (Mar. 28, 1871) (emphasis added). Representative
Stoughton also quoted from the testimony of freedman Caswell Holt, "who was twice visited
by the Ku Klux." Speaking of blacks in his county, Holt stated that:
[The Ku Klux Klan] wanted to run them all off because the principal part of them
voted the Radical [Republican] ticket . . . Question. Were those that would not vote
the Conservative [Democratic] ticket the ones that had these outrages committed on
them?Answer. Yes, sir. You never saw one bothered at all that voted the Conserva
tive ticket.
Co1 w. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 321 (Mar. 28, 1871). Congressman Buckley (R. Ala.) sup
Ported the observation of Boyd, Holt, and others that racial oppression was not the primary
animus or object
of the Klan-its true motive being a desire to wrest and keep control of
State governments from the Republicans, thereby subverting Congressional Reconstruction:
.
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ved, was usurpatio n, through terror
the Klan , the Republicans belie
.
u�hcan c?ntrol of outher states,
and political subversion, of Rep
ction pohcy and w1thdrawmg from
thereby overthrowing Reconstru
of laws and the equa l pr ivileges
the freedmen the equal protection
ction Ame ndm ents to the Con
nstru
and immunities that the Reco
Forty -Seco nd Congress, like
stitution were meant to secure. 1116 The
what to do. The Radical
Congresse s ever since, was divide d on
you can read about,
Republicans had some far reaching ideas that
secon d-hand in the
or
Globe,
al
either originally in the Congression
ve Shanks (R
entati
University of Chicago Law Revie w. m Repres
e
ind.) asserted in debate that the federal governm ent possess d the

�

�

authority "to go down into the several States to protect [United
States] citizens" in the enjoyme nt of their natural rights. Later
Shanks declared, "I do not want to see [the o riginal bill] so
What is the philosophy of Kukluxism? In what does it take its origin? It does not
originate i n Republican misrule. . . . Nor does this Ku Klux business take its origin
in the antagonisms of race. White and black suffer alike; more colored than white,
because the colored are the most numerous.

Id., app. at 194.

The observations contained in these primary sources are corroborated and confirmed by
Harold M. Hyman and William M. Wiecek in their recent book EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW:
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 1835-1875, at 301 ( 1982): "But concerns about civil rights,

even in their Reconstruction context, were never wholly race-centered: they included wide
and growing attention to the condition of white Unionists and bluecoats. Northerners, espe·

cially Republicans, were accustomed to blending these commitments."

156. The purpose of the Klan violence and intimidation was to subvert and replace
the Republican State governments with Democratic regimes sympathetic to a return to the
status quo ant e bellum, to a restoration of the Bourbon hegemony. The remarks of Con·

gressman Wilson (R. Ind.) are typical of the Republicans' perceptions: "And, sir, what is the
purpose of all this bloody work?. . . [l]t is for the express purpose of controlling govern·
ment in the States where these things are done, by preventing citizens from exercisi ng the ir
legitimate constitutional privileges." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong. , !st Sess. 484 (Apr. 5, 1871).

For corroboration of the Republicans' view by modern historians, see D. CHALMERS,
HOODED AMERICANISM: THE HISTORY OP THE Ku KLUX KLAN 1 1, 14 ( 1981); and A.
TREALEASE, WHITE TERROR: THE Ku KLUX KLAN CONSPIRACY AND S OUTHERN RECONSTRUC

TION pt. VI, at 383-98 (1971).

U.

157.

Comment, A Cons t ruct ion of Section 1985(c) in Light of Its Original Purpose, 46

� HI. L. REV . 402 (1979). Professor Alfred Avins also recounts the legislative history in his

article The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871: Some Reflected
Light on S t a te Action and the
Fourtee nth A m e n dm en t , 11 ST Louis U L J 329 (196
· both the
7). These art'1c1es are c1'ted m
maionty a n d the dissenting opinions. Judges
Rubin and Williams refer to B. SCHWARTZ,
STATUTORY .Hu
1iTO�Y OP THE UNITED STATES (1970), and
to several other law review articles
d
and notes, inc u mg Wildman 42 U S C § 1985(3'
1 - A p,wate Action to Vindi ca t e Four·
t eent h A men d ment Rights: A Paradox Resolved,
17 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 3 1 7 ( 1980); Com·
ment, Prwate Consp1rac1e.s to Violate Civil
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1 72 1 (19n)· Note, The
;;o u�e� WatM
ns of S�ctwn 1985(3) Litigation, 1973 LA & Soc.
Oao. 639. I is obvious
w
a t · co t 11.
oore stimulated the court
's 8ch01ar1Y abT
1 1ties; the opinions total 44 pages
(not countin g head notes) and 90 footnotes.
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amended that there shall be taken out of it the frank assertion of
the p ower o f the national Government to protect life, liberty, and
pro p erty, irrespective of the act of the State. " 168 But this view, and
with it the original version of Section 2 of the K u Klux Act, was
rejected on grounds that Congress did not have the power to feder
alize tort law. In the words of Congressman John A. Bingham,
chief author of the fourteenth a mendment: "God f orbid . . . that
b y so legislating we would strike down the rights of the State. . . .

I believe our dual system of g overnment essential t o o u r national
existence."169 One thing stands out from the debates: As finally
passed, the K u Klux Act was aimed at affording protection to
United States citizens in the Sou th within the contours of the fed
eral system the Republicans wanted to preserve-one with "a clear
and well defined line between the powers of the G eneral Govern
ment and the powers of the States. m6o Looking back over the his
tory of our constitutional law, it's fair to say the line has remained
neither clear nor well-defined.
At this point I had better confess that I am no historian. Like
most judges I take my history from the law reviews and from those
more q ualified than I to divine legislative p urpose from the dusty
pages of the Congressional Globe. But we all are obliged to do the
best we can.1 6 1 Scot t v. Moore, as we shall see in a moment, con
fro nts us with two versions of history; in doing s o it raises the
thorny problem of objectivity and reconstru ction in history, a mat

ter that has justifiably worried both scholars and practitioners
alike .1112

. One historical exegesis, not cited by either the majority or the
dissent in Scot t v. Moore this time from a professional historian
solid reputation in the field of Reconstruction history, Professor
.
ichael Les Benedict-pretty well sums u p the congressional

�

-

Inood that gave us the Ku Klux Klan Act as best I can fathom it:
1 58

1 59.
160.
61.
n
th1
i

CONG..

GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 141 (Apr. 3, 1871).

Id. app. at 84 (Mar. 31, 1871).
Id. at 187 (Rep. Chas. Willard, R. Vt.) (Apr.

6,

1871).

Most law schools, including the better ones, make no effort to train their students

e techniques of historical scholarship. What counts most is current caselaw, never mind
Past. Even the leading treatises in constitutional law are lamentably bereft of historical
ir o
r�
ation and background. Of course this is all wrong. See generally Scheiber, American
Co
ti t
6S
utional History and the New Legal History: Complimentary Themes in Two Modes,

th

J
7

F'

. A>.t. HIST. 337, 349 (1981).
See generally c. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY (1969);
IE�t;:R, US ES AND ABUSES OF LEGAL HISTORY: A PRACTITIONER'S VIEW (1962) (Selden Soc.

w162.

�ctUre).
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cans' rights, despite argu
As to the permanent protection for Ameri
scholars who write in
ments to the contrary by those modern legal
eviden ce of the congres
the tradition of a new nationa lism, all the
l ic contro
sional discussions, the ratification debates, and the p ub
versy indicates that Republicans intended the States to retain pri
mary jurisdiction over citizen's rights.188

Thus a limiting amendment was added to the Act as originally pro
posed, substituting the language now found in section 1985(3), pro
scribing conspiracies with "the purpose of depriving any persons
or class of person, directly or indirectly, of the equal protection of
the laws, or equal privileges and immunities under the laws." It is
not self-evident just what this means.

Enough legislative history. Like all statutes, section 1985(3)
must be interpreted and applied not only to the problems of the
past, but to the problems of the present, and to those of the future.
Doubtless history should play a part in determining the meaning
of either a federal statute or the United States Constitution.
Surely Cardozo was right in saying: " [H]istory, in illuminating the
past, illuminates the present, and in illuminating the present, il
luminates the future."184 But there are occasions when courts de 
cline to follow history in determining present law, and thereby the
law of the future. In Dean Pound's famous expression: "Law must
be stable and yet it cannot stand still."1611 Thus there is in this
Alligator Bayou case another ultimate concern, not of political sov
ereignty, but of the interrelatio nship between law and history.
Enter the courts. The year is 1971, the centenna rie of the Klan
Act; the case is Griffin v. Breckenridge,166 on certiorar i from the

Fifth Circuit; at issue are questions going to the scope and consti
tutionality of 42 U.S.C. section 1985(3) . Justice Stewar t begins by
paying tribute to Judge Irving Goldberg's opinio n
for the Fifth
Circuit below , which expressed "serious doubts" as
t o the " contin
ued v ita l ity of Collins v. Hardyman,167 which read
a state action
e emen t i n t section 985( 3) . Speaking for the Fift
h Circu it, Judge
( ,oJd herg sa d that it would not surprise
�
us if Coll ins v. Hardy
man were d i s ap pr oved and if § 1985 (3)
were held to embrace pri-

"

!

.}

�

l fi:I.

Bf'nrdic l,

< 'T. fh:v. :19, 48.
l f1 4 .

1 1;r, .

l tili .

l fii.



l'rf'�ervi1111 Federali.•m: Recons truction
and t he Waite
· Court, 1 97 8 SUP.

•upra note I , al 53.
H. 1'011N1 1, INTr.RPRF.TATIONs OP LEGAL
H1sTORv 1 (1923)
40:1 t l .S. 811 ( 197 1 ) .
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vate conspiracies to interfere with rights of national citizenship, "168
but he concluded that " [s)ince we may not adopt what the Su
preme Court has expressly rejected, we obediently abide the man
date in Collins. " 169 Here again is judging in the grand manner.
What a joy to be reversed by the Supreme Court-sometimes.
Griffin v. Breckenridge rejects the artificially restrictive con
struction of Collins, saying that "in the light of the evolution of
decisional law in the years that have passed since that case was
decided . . . many of the constitutional problems there perceived
simply do not exist. Little reason remains, therefore, not to accord
to the words of the statute their apparent meaning. " 110 Plainly,
there is no state action element in the words of the statute, and
Griffin construes it to cover private conspiracies. But not all tor
tious conspiratorial interferences with the rights of others are
covered.
The constitutional shoals that would lie in the path of interpreting §
1985(3) as a general federal tort law can be avoided by giving full
effect to the congressional purpose-by requiring, as an element of
the cause of action, the kind of invidiously discriminatory motiva
tion stressed by the sponsors of the limiting amendment.

171

At this point Justice Stewart emphasized the language quoted
above requiring intent to deprive persons or classes of persons of
equal protection of the laws, or equal privileges and immunities
under laws. " [T]here must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise
class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspir
ators ' action,"172 said Justice Stewart for the Court. This latter
statement, as best I can make out, is a quantum jump away from
the original purpose of the Ku Klux Klan Act, viz., political sub
version.178 But remember a century has intervened; original pur
pose may have little to do with present problems. The Klan in
168. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 410 F.2d 817, 825-26, (5th Cir. 1969).
169. Id. at 826-27.
170. 403 U.S. at 95-96.
171 . Id. at 102.
172. Id.
173. There is a marked tendency for the modern mind, looking backwards, to see its
own day and age, and its own problems, reflected in the past, rather than to see the past for
What it really was. This tendency-historians call it the "fallacy of presentism"-doubtless
Produces other, lesser slips, such as dating the Congressional Globe 1971 instead of 1871, as
it mistakenly appears in both the en bane majority slip opinion and in the published report
of Scott v. Moore, 640 F.2d at 721 (panel opinion); 680 F.2d at 993 (en bane majority opin
ion). This blunder escaped the notice of 24 Fifth Circuit judges, 72 law clerks (each judge
has three), and the sharp eyes at West Publishing Co.
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1971 is a different animal, out to bust black skulls for different
reasons. Racism has replaced politics in the scheming of the Klan.
The complaint in

Griffin r ecited a scenario typical of the In

visible Empire at its worst: A bunch of whites mistook blacks
travelling o n state and federal highways in Mississippi for civil
rights workers; blocked their way; dragged them out of their car;
and beat them over the head with clubs. Justice Stewart for a
unanimous Supreme Court understandably had little tolerance for
this kind of conduct. "Indeed, the conduct here alleged lies so close
to the core of the coverage intended by Congress that it is hard to
conceive of wholly private conduct that would come within the
statute if this does not."174 Query, what about a conspiracy aimed
at busting nonunion hardhats along the banks of Alligator Bayou?
How far out from the core is it permissible to draw analogies? And
what of the penumbra? You can see where we're going.
In

Griffin the Court was quick to throw the mantle of the stat

ute's federal protection over " Negro citizens who have been the
victims o f conspiratorial, racially discriminatory private action
aimed at depriving them of the basic rights that the law secures to
all free men "17G This was authorized by the thirteenth amendment
.
and its enforcement clause, said Justice Stewart. Furthermore,
plaintiffs were exercising their right of interstate travel, one of
those basic rights protected by the Constitution even as against
private deprivation. It was clear to Justice Stewart that plaintiffs
"had suffered from conduct that Congress may reach under its
power to p rotect the right of i nterstate travel."178 Justice Stewart
wound up his reversing opinion in the accustomed fashion: "The
judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi for
further � roceedings consistent with this opinion. "177 This brings
us, full c ircle, back to the Fifth Circuit.

��9ore

We re �ch
u:
proper . Judge Clark's majority opin
.
ion, a�rm mg. mJunct1ve
nd monetary relief agains t the defen
dants.. mcludm g ev era_l unions, is built upon two major premises:
( 1 ) pr i v ate , consp iratorial abridgment of first
amen dmen t freedoms

��ott

�

�
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·
t1vr

174.
1 7f>.
1 71i.
1 77 .
1 7H .
rr 1 1t· f
·

--

------

·IO:I \ J .S. al 10:1.
Id. al IOfJ.
Id. nl 1 06 .
I d . nl 1 07 .
.
W h ..t h N t h e Norrie l.a(;uerdia Act , 2 9 U.S C §§
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is a denial of equal protection of the laws within the meaning of
section 1985(3) as interpreted in Griffin; and (2) C ongress intended
the statute to reach not only racially motivated class-based denials
of equal protection, but other similar kinds of class-based "invidi
ous discrimination" as well. This latter idea follows the reasoning
of the Fifth C ircuit, again sitting en bane, in Kimble v. McDuffy,11•
decided in 1981, ten years after Griffin. In Kimble the court con
sidered what other kinds of class-based animus section 1985(3)
might reach, and concluded two types of classes come within the
statute's coverage. First, the statute covers classes " having com
mon characteristics of an inherent nature"-viz., those kinds of
classes offered special protection under the equal protection
clause.180 The Fifth Circuit also recognized that:
The class-based animus required by the Supreme Court in Griffin
and now reasserted by this court is not identical with the class
based distinctions required to support an action under the equal
protection clause. . . . For example, section 1985 was certainly in
tended to cover conspiracies against Republicans; distinctions based
on affiliation with a major political party are not among those tradi
tionally subject to special scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amend

ment. What Griffin stands for, and what we now hold, is that Sec
tion 1985 was intended to encompass only those conspiracies
motivated by animus against the kinds of classes Congress was try
ing to protect when it enacted the Ku Klux Klan Act.181

The essential minor premise in Scott v. Moore, of course, is that
the nonunion construction workers who were injured in the case ,
although not the usual "discreet and insular minorities"182 pro

tected by the equal protection clause, are "the kind [ ] of class[ ]

Congress was trying to protect when it enacted the Ku Klux Klan
Act."183 You can see how a statute, once it is cut loose from its
historical moorings, is not easily cabined.
The majority in Scott v. Moore refuses to follow the law of the
Fourth and Seventh Circuits to the effect that section 1 985(3) pro
vides no remedy for purely private impairment of first amendment
speech and associational freedoms. m These holdings, according to
179.
180.

648 F.2d 340 (5th Cir. 1981) (en bane).
Id. at 347.

181.

Id. at 347 n.9.

182.

United States

183.

Kimble

v.

v.

Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4. (1938).

McDuffy, 648 F.2d at 347 n.9.

184. Bellamy v. Mason's Stores, 508 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1974); Murphy
mel High School, 543 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1976).

v.

Mount Car
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the S u prem e Court 's reasoning
Judge Clark , are inconsistent with
r e ma i n s via ble, we are bound by
in Griffin and "so long as Griffin
reaches all deprivations of
its determination that sectio n 1 985(3 )
1 6
e. " 8 The difficulty with
equal protection, what ever their sourc
dmen t, even as trans
Judge Clark 's analysis is that the first amen
amend ment right,m
enth
fourte
mogrified by incorp oratio n into a
t govern ment, not
has always been viewed as a restric tion agains
without
private individuals C onstitutional law i s confus i ng enough
.
n
the notion of a first amendment violatio n of t h e equal protectio
plainly
985(:3)
1
n
io
t
sec
h
Althoug
acy.
clause by private conspir
reaches both public and private conspira cies aimed at denying per
sons equal protection of the laws, "it is a non sequitur to conclude
"
that it, therefore, reaches all constitution al v i o l a tions .

1 87

Contrary to what is said in the majority op i n i on, the determi·
nation whether a conspiracy is aimed at depriving "any person or
class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal
privileges and immunities under the laws " 1 88-which is the Ian·

guage of the limiting amendment-does not have as a component
"the violation of some protected right. "189 Justice Stewa rt s opin·
'

ion for the Court in Griffin carefully separates the determination
of invidiously discriminatory animus-the second el eme n t of a sec·
tion 1985(3) claim-and the determination whether the conspiracy
deprived another "of having and exercising any right or privilege of
a citizen of the United States "-the fourth element of the cause of
action. 1 90 Subsequent t o Griffin the Supreme Co u rt has made it

clear that sec�ion 1985(3) "provides no substanti ve r i g hts itself; it
merely provides a remedy for violation of t he rights it
d e�ignat s. "191 Those des gnated rights are the ri g hts of national
�
_
citizens
hip, as Judge Irvmg Goldbe rg correctly r e cog n iz ed when
Griffin _v. Breckenridge was first before the Fifth C i r cu it in 1969;
and �hile t � first amen i:nent, including freedom of association, is
_
certamly a right
or privilege of a citize n o f th
e um"t ed States, "
.
. ht on1y shields the people
al rig
th.is nation
ag ams t governmen t not

�
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�

,

·

185.

680 F. 2d at 990.

See Near v. Minnesota 283 U S 697 707 (193
1 ) (per Hughes, C.J.) ("It is no
longer open to doubt that the li erty 0f · press,
·
'and
of speech • ts
· w1"th·m th e l"b
1 ertY safe·
guarded from invasion by state action · ") '- G'tl
1 ow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 ( 1925)
.
tum)
(d c
187. Scott v. Moore, 680 F.2d at 1012 (Rubin
·
and Wilh ams, JJ., disse
nting ).
·
188. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
186.

b

i

189.
190.
191.

680 F.2d at 988.

403 U.S. at 102-03 for an especially pertine
nt d iscu
.
ssi. on.
Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. N
ovotny, 442 U.S.
366,
See
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their neighbors. As Judges Rubin and Williams recognize in their
dissent-correctly, it is submitted: "The extension of § 1985(3) to
protect against private infringement of every right protected
against governmental action b y the Constitution would create a
Bivens-type tort action against every private cons piracy that af
fects a federal constitutional right."192 With all respect, the major
ity in Scott v. Moore interprets section 1985(3) to create substan
tive rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the
laws, an approach the Supreme C ourt has expressly r ejected in the
parallel field of constitutional interpretation. "It is not the prov
ince of this Court to create substantive constitutional rights in the
name of guaranteeing equal p rotection of the laws,"193 the Su
preme Court has said. By parity of reasoning, it is likewise not the
function of the Fifth Circuit to create substantive statutory rights
in the name of guaranteeing equal protection, or to overrule the
Civil Rights Casesm by statutory reconstruction.

The majority's minor premise-that nonunion construction
workers are the kind of class Congress was trying to protect when
it passed the Ku Klux Klan Act in 187 1-also seems strained. Cer
tainly Congress could not have specifically intended to protect
nonunion workers; the labor movement in America was yet to be
born. The purpose of the Klan Act was protection of Republicans
against political repression, not labor violence. By way of response,
the majority resorts to reasoning by analogy. We are told: (1) "an
animus directed against nonunion association is closely akin to ani
mus directed against political association"; and (2) "the position of
these nonunion employees in Jefferson County, Texas, is markedly
similar to that of the Republicans in the South."1911 It is precisely
at this point that the majority a n d the dissent part company. Says
the dissent: "Congress in 187 1 was assuredly not trying the protect

192.

680 F.2d at 1014.

193.

San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973).

194.

109 U.S. 3 (1883). Compare Mr. Justice Jackson's comment, dissenting in United

States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 635 (1954): "Judicial construction, constitutional or statu
tory, is always subject to hazards of judicial reconstruction." Compare Frankfurter, J., con
curri ng in Graves v. N.Y. ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 491-92 (1939), wherein note is taken
of the occasional tendency on the part of judges "to encrust unwarranted interpretations
upon the Constitution and thereafter to consider merely what has been judicially said about
the Constitution, rather than to be primarily controlled by a fair conception of the Constitu
tion." The same thing, of course, can be said of statutory construction, and the judicial
history of section 1985(3)-from Griffin u. Breckenridge on down-is a striking illustration
of this encrustation phenomenon.
195.

680 F.2d at 994.
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bec ause it would not the n have recog
non-u nion workers, not only
unio n members and non -union mem
nized the difference between
Kla n posed no thre at to such work
bers but simply because the
forgets, and the d issen t notes only
ers."186 What the majority
Klan spread from Ten nessee in the
slightly, is that as soon as the
piracy no long er lay within the
spring of 1868 , "the Ku Klux cons
It was this state powe rlessne ss
"197
power of most states to control.
ction in the first place. 10s
prote
that prompted extension of federal
state of Texa s, with its crimi
Nothing suggests that the sovereign
bring the viole nce at Alliga
nal and civil courts, was powerless to
ate relief to its vic
tor Bayou under control, or to provide adequ
ty's failure to take
majori
the
court,
the
to
tims. With all respect
ss to the Klan
faithle
is
relief
into accoun t the availability of state
ifiably ex
unjust
and
Act's original history, if not its literal text,
tends federal judicial power beyond its legitima te border s.199
Judges Rubin and Williams would apply "a purely historical
test"200 in interpreting the Klan Act. On the other side of the
fence, Judge Clark instructs us that "the protection afforded by
the civil rights acts is not static."201 The dissent reads the law nar
rowly, tying it to the past. Judge Clark construes the statute with
the breadth of a constitution, bequeathing it to the future.202 Per
haps there is no right or wrong here, only sides to choose. Some
judges prefer to follow history. Other judges, equally faithfully to
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become so pronounced that President Grant himself requested the passage of

leg1slat1on aimed at stabilizing the South, for state authorities were themselves powerless to
act:

"[T) he

power to correct these evils is beyond the control of the State authorities . . . . "

CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 236 (Mar. 23, 1871).
See also the remarks of Congressman Cook (R.-111.) defending "the right of the United
States to interfere and protect the citizen in person and property, when, by unlawful com bi
nauo na too strong for the State authorities to put down or subdue, the citizen is deprived of
.
h1a nghta." Id. at 485 (Apr. 5, 187 1 ) .
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Breckenridge itself cut the

Klan Act loose from history.203 Judge Clark and the majority in

Scott

v.

Moore continue the voyage. Should the law follow history,

or make it? There is no one answer.
And what of the statute as construed by the majority? Can
Congress reach out this far? The majority says yes, pegging its con
struction on the commerce clause, and citing such familiar prece
dents as United States

Katzenbach

v.

v. Da r by ,204 Wickard v. Filburn,20" and
McClung.206 There was evidence of goods purchased

outside Texas; that was enough commerce among the states to sat
isfy the majority. Judge Clark quotes Chief Justice Marshall's im
mortal utterance in McCulloch

v.

Maryland: "Let the end be legit

imate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means
which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end,
which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of
the constitution, are constitutional."207 Applying these standards,
the majority concludes Congress acted within its constitutional
power "when it enacted section 1985(3) to reach the private con
spiracy involved here."208 This assumes, of course, that Congress
was thinking about interstate commerce when it passed the Klu
Klux Klan Act in 1871, a dubious proposition at best. As a matter
of demonstrable historical record, the Forty-Second Congress had
no such thing in mind. The dissenting judges make this clear, and
Judge Garwood's response to the maj ority's reliance on McCulloch
v.

Marylan d is devastating: " It stands McCulloch

v.

Maryland on

its head to say that an 'end' n o t intended by Congress, and which
Congress was not required to intend, can be used to sustain, and in
sustaining to transform, an act of Congress taken in the exercise of
distinctly different constitutional powers. "209 In the old Myers case
in the Supreme Court, Senator George Wharton Pepper told the
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So did Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 ( 1968). See generally Casper,

v.

Mayer: Clio, Bemused and Confused Muse, 1968 SuP. CT. REV. 89; Gerber, Playing
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Tricks on the Dead: Jones
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Alfred H. Mayer Company, An Historical Inquiry, 1 PACE L.

REv. 59 (1980). Professor Louis Henkin has charged that the Jones Court was "carried away
by opportunity and temptation to do also Congress' share and to give the country statutes
which no Congress ever enacted." Henkin, The Supreme Court 1967 Term-Foreword: On
Drawing Lines, 82 HARV. L. REV. 63, 83 (1968).
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The philo sopher Sidney Hook has writte n:
There is a difference between using our knowledge of the history of
the past in order to influence the future, to ?elp bring ab? ut events
we regard desirable and to forestall those which are und_es1rable, and
making or manufacturing a history of the past solely with an eye to
achieve our aims. m

Scott v. Moore, if not bad statutory construction, is bad constitu
tional law because it rests upon-say it softly-fiction.

Editor's Addendum
On July 5, 1983, after Professor Baier's analysis of Scott v.
Moore was submitted to the Review, the United States Supreme
Court, in a five-to-four decision, reversed the en bane decision of
the Fifth Circuit. In United Brotherhood of Carpenters v . Scott,212
the Court c onfirmed the view that, even in a section 1985(3) con
text, state involvement is still required to violate first amendment
rights.218 The Court recognized that section 1985(3) d oes not create
substantive statutory rights and that nonunion construction work
ers are not the kind of class that comes within the protection of
section 1985( 3) .214 In refusing to hold that section 1985(3) covers
conspiracies motivated by invid iously discriminatory intent other
than racial bias, the Court interpreted the statute not to include
group actions resting on economic motivations such as union
controversies.21 11

210. Myers v. United Ststes, 272 U.S. 52, 70 (1926). See also
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the Fourteenth Ame�d�ent, 11 ST. Louis U.L.J. 331, 381
n.249 (1967).
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